সমললৈ যাওক

কাশ্মিৰী হিন্দুৰ নিৰ্বাসন

অসমীয়া ৱিকিপিডিয়াৰ পৰা
কাশ্মিৰী হিন্দুৰ নিৰ্বাসন
Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus

বিতৰ্কিত কাশ্মীৰ অঞ্চলৰ ৰাজনৈতিক মানচিত্ৰত কাশ্মীৰ উপত্যকা দেখুওৱা হৈছে, ভাৰতীয় প্ৰশাসিত কাশ্মীৰ বিভাগত (নিয়ন নীলা ৰঙেৰে), য’ৰ পৰা হিন্দুৰ এক বৃহৎ অংশই প্ৰব্ৰজন কৰিছে।
তাৰিখ ১৯৯০ৰ প্ৰাৰম্ভিক কাল[1][2]
স্থান কাশ্মীৰ উপত্যকা, ভাৰত-শাসিত কাশ্মীৰ
ভৌগোলিক স্থানাংক 34°02′00″N 74°40′00″E / 34.0333°N 74.6667°E / 34.0333; 74.6667স্থানাংক: 34°02′00″N 74°40′00″E / 34.0333°N 74.6667°E / 34.0333; 74.6667
পৰৰ্ৱতী প্ৰভাৱ * ৯০,০০০–১,০০,০০০ [3][4][5][6][7]
  • Other scholars have suggested a higher figure of approximately 150,000 for the exodus.[8][9][note 1]
মৃত্যু * ৩০-৮০ জন কাশ্মিৰী পণ্ডিতৰ হত্যা কৰা হৈছিল, যেতিয়া পলায়ন প্ৰায় শেষ হৈছিল[7][12][13]
  • ভাৰতীয় গৃহ মন্ত্ৰালয়ৰ তথ্যত ১৯৮৮ চনৰ পৰা ১৯৯১ চনলৈকে চাৰি বছৰৰ ভিতৰত ২১৭ জন হিন্দু সাধাৰণ নাগৰিকৰ মৃত্যুৰ তথ্য লিপিবদ্ধ কৰা হৈছে;[14] আন এজন পণ্ডিতে ২২৮ জন পণ্ডিত অসামৰিক মৃত্যুৰ অনুমান কৰিছে।[15] জম্মু-কাশ্মীৰ চৰকাৰে ১৯৮৯ চনৰ পৰা ২০০৪ চনৰ ভিতৰত ২১৯ জন পণ্ডিতৰ মৃত্যুৰ তথ্য লাভ কৰিছে।[16][17]

কাশ্মীৰী হিন্দু বা কাশ্মিৰী পণ্ডিতৰ নিৰ্বাসন বা বৰ্হিগমন বা বিতাড়ন, (ইংৰাজী: Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus)[note 2] [1][2] হৈছে কুৰি শতিকাৰ শেষৰফালে বা ১৯৯০ দশকৰ কালছোৱাত[19] কাশ্মীৰৰ সংখ্যাগৰিষ্ঠ মুছলমানৰ ক্ৰমবৰ্দ্ধমান বিদ্ৰোহে সৃষ্টি কৰা হিংসাৰ পৰা পৰিত্ৰাণ পাবলৈ কাশ্মীৰ ত্যাগ কৰা এক ঘটনাপ্ৰৱাহ। [20] উল্লেখনীয় যে, মুঠ ১২০,০০০–১৪০,০০০ পণ্ডিতৰ জনসংখ্যাৰ ভিতৰত প্ৰায় ৯০,০০০–১০০,০০০ লোকে কাশ্মীৰ উপত্যকা এৰি আহে[3][5][4][7]৷ অনেককে এৰি যাবলৈ বাধ্য কৰোৱা হয়৷[21][note 3] ভাৰতীয় গৃহ মন্ত্ৰালয়ৰ তথ্য মতে, ১৯৮৮ চনৰ পৰা ১৯৯১ চনলৈকে চাৰি বছৰৰ ভিতৰত ২১৭ জন হিন্দু সাধাৰণ নাগৰিকৰ মৃত্যুৰ তথ্য লিপিবদ্ধ কৰা হৈছে৷ আন এজন পণ্ডিতে ২২৮ জন পণ্ডিত অসামৰিক মৃত্যুৰ অনুমান কৰিছে। জম্মু-কাশ্মীৰ চৰকাৰে ১৯৮৯ চনৰ পৰা ২০০৪ চনৰ ভিতৰত ২১৯ জন পণ্ডিতৰ মৃত্যুৰ তথ্য লাভ কৰিছে। [7][12][13]

যথেষ্ট মাত্ৰাৰ বৰ্হিগমনৰ সময়ছোৱাত এই বিদ্ৰোহৰ নেতৃত্ব দিছিল ধৰ্মনিৰপেক্ষ আৰু স্বাধীন কাশ্মীৰ বিচৰা এটা গোটে। সমান্তৰালভাৱে ইছলামিক ৰাষ্ট্ৰৰ দাবীত ইছলামিক ফৈদো ক্ৰমাৎ বৃদ্ধি পাইছিল।[24][25][26]

এই প্ৰব্ৰজনৰ কাৰণসমূহৰ বিষয়ে ভালেমান যুক্তি-তৰ্ক আৰু তথ্য আগবঢ়োৱা হৈছে৷ ১৯৮৯–১৯৯০ চনত কাশ্মীৰী মুছলমানসকলে ভাৰতৰ পৰা স্বাধীনতা বিচাৰি জনোৱা আহ্বানবোৰ বৃদ্ধি হয়৷ [27]নবৈৰ দশকত কেইবাজনো পণ্ডিত বিষয়াৰ হত্যাকাণ্ডই হয়তো সম্প্ৰদায়টোৰ নিৰাপত্তাবোধক জোকাৰি গৈছিল; যদিও কিছুমান পণ্ডিতে পৰৱৰ্তী সময়ত ভাৰতীয় আদালতত দিয়া প্ৰমাণৰ জৰিয়তে ভবা হয় যে -তেওঁলোকৰে একাংশই ভাৰতীয় ৰাষ্ট্ৰৰ এজেণ্ট হিচাপে কাম কৰিছিল।[28]জম্মু-কাশ্মীৰ লিবাৰেচন ফ্ৰণ্টে (জেকেএলএফ) লক্ষ্য কৰি হত্যা কৰা পণ্ডিতসকলৰ ভিতৰত কিছুমান উচ্চ পদস্থ পণ্ডিতো আছিল।[29]মাজে মাজে মছজিদৰ পৰা লাউডস্পীকাৰত হিন্দু বিৰোধী সতৰ্কবাণী দিয়া হৈছিল, পণ্ডিতসকলক উপত্যকা এৰি যাবলৈ কোৱা হৈছিল।[30][31]ভাবুকি দিয়া চিঠিয়ে ভয়ৰ সৃষ্টি কৰিছিল৷[32]৷পিছৰ সাক্ষাৎকাৰত চিঠিৰ কথা কম হৈছিল[33]মুছলমান আৰু পণ্ডিত দুয়োটা সম্প্ৰদায়ৰ বিৱৰণীৰ মাজত বৈষম্য আছিল।[34]বহুতো কাশ্মীৰী পণ্ডিতে বিশ্বাস কৰিছিল যে তেওঁলোকক হয় পাকিস্তান আৰু ইয়াৰ সমৰ্থনত থকা উগ্ৰপন্থীয়ে নহয় কাশ্মীৰী মুছলমানসকলে এটা গোট হিচাপে উপত্যকাৰ পৰা বাহিৰলৈ উলিয়াই আনিবলৈ বাধ্য কৰাইছিল।[35] বহু মুছলমানে বিশ্বাস কৰিছিল যে তেতিয়াৰ ৰাজ্যপাল জগমোহনে পণ্ডিতসকলক যাবলৈ উৎসাহিত কৰিছিল যাতে মুছলমানসকলৰ বিৰুদ্ধে প্ৰতিশোধ লোৱাত সহজ হ'ব পাৰে।[36][37]

তথ্যসূত্ৰ

[সম্পাদনা কৰক]
  1. 1 2
    • Bose, Sumantra (2021), Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-century conflict, প্ৰকাশক New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 373, ISBN 978-0-300-25687-1, "Some Pandits constituted a privileged class under the princely state (1846–1947). When insurrection engulfed the Valley in early 1990, approximately 120,000 Pandits lived in the Valley, making up about 3 per cent of the Valley’s population. In February–March 1990, the bulk of the Pandits (about 90,000–100,000 people) left the Valley for safety amid incidents of intimidation and sporadic killings of prominent members of the community by Kashmiri Muslim militants; most moved to the southern, Hindu-majority Indian J&K city of Jammu or to Delhi."
    • Rai, Mridu (2021), "Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past", in Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha, Kashmir and the Future of South Asia, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, ISBN 9781000318845, https://books.google.com/books?id=K20LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA91, "Beginning in January 1990, such large numbers of Kashmiri Pandits – the community of Hindus native to the valley of Kashmir – left their homeland and so precipitously that some have termed their departure an exodus. Indeed, within a few months, nearly 100,000 of the 140,000- strong community had left for neighbouring Jammu, Delhi, and other parts of India and the world."
    • Hussain, Shahla (2021), Kashmir in the Aftermath of the Partition, Cambridge University Press, pp. 320, 321, ISBN 9781108901130, https://books.google.com/books?id=_URFEAAAQBAJ, "The Counter-narrative of Aazadi: Kashmiri Hindus and Displacement of the Homeland (p. 320) In March 1990, the majority of Kashmiri Hindus left the Valley for "refugee" camps in and outside the Hindu-dominated region of Jammu."
    • Duschinski, Haley (2018), "'Survival Is Now Our Politics': Kashmiri Pandit Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, প্ৰকাশক Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–198, 179, ISBN 9781108226127, https://books.google.com/books?id=CPFKDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA178, "Although various political stakeholders dispute the number of Kashmiri Pandits who left the Valley at that time, Alexander Evans estimates on the basis of census data and demographic figures that over 1,00,000 left in a few months in early 1990, while 1,60,000 in total left the Valley during the 1990s"
    • Gates, Scott; Roy, Kaushik (2016), Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present, Critical Essays on Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 9780754629771, "India’s response has been more brutal than ever before. The government's efforts to roll back the insurgency and the militants’ armed resolve to “liberate” Kashmir have produced daily deaths. The Muslims constitute a majority of those killed, primarily by India’s armed forces but also by armed Muslim militants silencing dissenters in their own community. The number of Hindus killed would have been greater if most of them had not migrated to camps in Jammu and Delhi. Some left after losing kith and kin to Islamic militants, others after receiving death threats, but most departed in utter panic between January and March 1990—simply to preempt death. Of the more than 150,000 Hindus, only a few are left in the valley."
  2. 1 2
    • Kapur, S. Paul (2007), Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Stanford University Press, pp. 102–103, ISBN 978-0-8047-5549-8, "When the Kashmir insurgency began, roughly 130,000 to 140,000 Kashmiri Pandits, who are Hindus, lived in Kashmir Valley. By early 1990, in the face of some targeted anti-Pandit attacks and rising overall violence in the region, approximately 100,000 Pandits had fled the valley, many of them ending up in refugee camps in southern Kashmir."
    • Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina (2018), "Recognizing cascades in India and Kashmir", Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia, Australian National University Press, ISBN 9781760461898, "... when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process."
    • Kumar, Radha; Puri, Ellora (2009), "Jammu and Kashmir: Frameworks for a Settlement", in Kumar, Radha, Negotiation Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: A Set of Simulations, প্ৰকাশক New Delhi, Los Angeles and London: SAGE Publications, p. 292, ISBN 978-81-7829-882-5, "1990: In January BJP strongman Jagmohan is reappointed Governor. Farooq Abdullah resigns. A large number of unarmed protesters are killed in firing by the Indian troops in separate incidents. 400,000 Kashmiris march to the UN Military Observers Group to demand implementation of the plebiscite resolution. A number of protestors are killed after the police fires at them. A number of prominent Kashmiris are killed by militants, among whom Pandits form a substantial number. Pandits begin to be forced out of the Kashmir valley. The rise of new militant groups, some warnings in anonymous posters and some unexplained killings of innocent members of the community, contribute to an atmosphere of insecurity for the Kashmiri Pandits. Estimated 140,000 Hindus, including the entire Kashmiri Pandit community, flee the valley in March."
    • Hussain, Shahla (2018), "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, প্ৰকাশক Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112, 105, ISBN 9781107181977, https://books.google.com/books?id=g09bDwAAQBAJ, "In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community. This event created unbridgeable differences between the majority and the minority; each perceived aazadi in a different light."
  3. 1 2 Bose, Sumantra (2021), Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-century conflict, প্ৰকাশক New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 373, ISBN 978-0-300-25687-1, "Some Pandits constituted a privileged class under the princely state (1846–1947). When insurrection engulfed the Valley in early 1990, approximately 120,000 Pandits lived in the Valley, making up about 3 per cent of the Valley’s population. In February–March 1990, the bulk of the Pandits (about 90,000–100,000 people) left the Valley for safety amid incidents of intimidation and sporadic killings of prominent members of the community by Kashmiri Muslim militants; most moved to the southern, Hindu-majority Indian J&K city of Jammu or to Delhi."
  4. 1 2 Kapur, S. Paul (2007), Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Stanford University Press, pp. 102–103, ISBN 978-0-8047-5549-8, "When the Kashmir insurgency began, roughly 130,000 to 140,000 Kashmiri Pandits, who are Hindus, lived in Kashmir Valley. By early 1990, in the face of some targeted anti-Pandit attacks and rising overall violence in the region, approximately 100,000 Pandits had fled the valley, many of them ending up in refugee camps in southern Kashmir."
  5. 1 2 Rai, Mridu (2021), "Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past", in Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha, Kashmir and the Future of South Asia, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, ISBN 9781000318845, https://books.google.com/books?id=K20LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA91, "Beginning in January 1990, such large numbers of Kashmiri Pandits – the community of Hindus native to the valley of Kashmir – left their homeland and so precipitously that some have termed their departure an exodus. Indeed, within a few months, nearly 100,000 of the 140,000-strong community had left for neighbouring Jammu, Delhi, and other parts of India and the world. One immediate impetus for this departure in such dramatically large numbers was the inauguration in 1989 of a popularly backed armed Kashmiri insurgency against Indian rule. This insurrection drew support mostly from the Valley’s Muslim population. By 2011, the numbers of Pandits remaining in the Valley had dwindled to between 2,700 and 3,400, according to different estimates. An insignificant number have returned."
  6. ↑ Metcalf, Barbara D.; Metcalf, Thomas R. (2012), A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge Concise Histories (3 সম্পাদনা), প্ৰকাশক Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 308–309, ISBN 978-1-107-02649-0, "The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Upwards of 100,000 of them left the state during the early 1990s; their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate ‘suspects’ and weed out Pakistani ‘infiltrators’, the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict."
  7. 1 2 3 4 Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina (2018), "Recognizing cascades in India and Kashmir", Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia, Australian National University Press, ISBN 9781760461898, "... when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process."
  8. ↑ উদ্ধৃতি ত্ৰুটি: অবৈধ <ref> টেগ; evans-migration-1990 নামৰ refৰ বাবে কোনো পাঠ্য প্ৰদান কৰা হোৱা নাই
  9. ↑ উদ্ধৃতি ত্ৰুটি: অবৈধ <ref> টেগ; talbot-singh-pandits-exodus-numbers নামৰ refৰ বাবে কোনো পাঠ্য প্ৰদান কৰা হোৱা নাই
  10. ↑ Madan 2008, পৃষ্ঠা 25
  11. ↑ "South Asia. India". The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency. 21 December 2021. Archived from the original on 18 March 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210318202107/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/india। আহৰণ কৰা হৈছে: 21 November 2025.
  12. 1 2 Bose, Sumantra (2021), Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict., Yale University Press, p. 92, ISBN 978-0-300-25687-1, https://books.google.com/books?id=BK9FEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA92, "On 15 March 1990, by which time the Pandit exodus from the Valley was substantially complete, the All-India Kashmiri Pandit Conference, a community organisation, stated that thirty-two Pandits had been killed by militants since the previous autumn."
  13. 1 2 Joshi, Manoj (1999), The Lost Rebellion, Penguin Books, p. 65, ISBN 978-0-14-027846-0, https://books.google.com/books?id=pS5uAAAAMAAJ, "By the middle of the year some eighty persons had been killed ..., and the fear ... had its effect from the very first killings. Beginning in February, the pandits began streaming out of the valley, and by June some 58,000 families had relocated to camps in Jammu and Delhi."
  14. ↑ Swami 2007, পৃষ্ঠা. 175.
  15. ↑ Evans 2002, pp. 19–37, 23: "The Indian government figures are set out in its Profile of Terrorist Violence in Jammu & Kashmir (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, March 1998). Between 1988 and 1991, the government claims 228 Hindu civilians were killed. Even if the bulk of government officials and politicians killed over the same period were Hindus and this is added, this figure would increase by a further maximum of 160. Hence the figure of 700 appears deeply unreliable."
  16. ↑ উদ্ধৃতি ত্ৰুটি: অবৈধ <ref> টেগ; fp219 নামৰ refৰ বাবে কোনো পাঠ্য প্ৰদান কৰা হোৱা নাই
  17. ↑ Manzar, Bashir (2013), "Kashmir: A Tale of Two Communities, Cloven", Economic and Political Weekly খণ্ড XLVIII (30): 177–178, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23528003, "Official records suggest that 219 Kashmiri Pandits had been killed by militants since 1989."
  18. ↑ ""Exodus, n."", Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press, 2021, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66307
  19. ↑
    • Evans 2002, পৃষ্ঠা 20
    • Zia, Ather (2020), Resisting Disappearance: Military Occupation and Women's Activism in Kashmir, University of Washington Press, p. 60, ISBN 9780295745008, https://books.google.com/books?id=M6wGEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60, "In the early 1990s the Kashmiri Hindus, known as the Pandits (a 100,000 to 140,000 strong community), migrated en masse from Kashmir to Jammu, Delhi, and other places."
    • Hussain, Shahla (2018), "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, প্ৰকাশক Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112, 105, ISBN 9781107181977, https://books.google.com/books?id=g09bDwAAQBAJ, "The rise of insurgency in the region created a difficult situation for the Kashmiri Hindu community, which had always taken pride in their Indian identity. Self-determination was not only seen as a communal demand but as a secessionist slogan that threatened the security of the Indian state. The community felt threatened when Kashmiri Muslims under the flag of aazadi openly raised anti-India slogans. The 1989 targeted killings of Kashmiri Hindus who the insurgents believed were acting as Indian intelligence agents heightened those insecurities. In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community."
    • Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States", Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, Rutgers University Press, "The mass migration of Kashmiri Hindus from Kashmir Valley began in November 1989 and accelerated in the following months. Every family has its departure story. Many families simply packed their belongings into their cars and left under cover of night, without words of farewell to friends and neighbours. In some cases, wives and children left first, while husbands stayed behind to watch for the situation to improve; in other cases, parents sent their teenage sons away after hearing threats against them, and followed them days or weeks later. Many migrants report that they entrusted their house keys and belongings to the Muslim neighbours or servants and expected to return to their homes after a few weeks. Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Hindus left Kashmir Valley in the span of several months. There are also competing perspectives on the factors that led to the mass migration of Kashmiri Hindus during this period. Kashmiri Hindus describe migration as a forced exodus driven by Islamic fundamendalist elements in Pakistan that spilled across the Line of Control into the Kashmir Valley. They think that Kashmiri Muslims had acted as bystanders to violence by not protecting lives and properties of the vulnerable Hindu community from the militant ... The mass migration, however, was understood differently by the Muslim religious majority in Kashmir. These Kashmiri Muslims, many of whom were committed to the cause of regional independence, believed that Kashmiri Hindus betrayed them by withdrawing their support from the Kashmiri nationalist movement and turning to the government of India for protection at the moment of ... This perspective is supported by claims, articulated by some prominent separatist political leaders, that the Indian government orchestrated the mass migration of the Kashmiri Hindu community in order to have a free hand to crack down on the popular uprising. These competing perspectives gave rise to mutual feelings of suspicion and betrayal—feelings that lingered between Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus and became more entrenched as time continued."
    • Bhatia, Mohita (2020), Rethinking Conflict at the Margins: Dalits and Borderland Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir, প্ৰকাশক Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9, ISBN 9781108883467, https://books.google.com/books?id=NRnxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA9, "Despite witnessing a prolonged spell of insurgency including a few incidents of selective killings, Jammu was still considered to be a relatively safe refuge by the Hindu community of Kashmir, the Pandits. As a minuscule Hindu minority community in the Muslim-majority Kashmir (around 3 per cent of Kashmir's population), they felt more vulnerable and noticeable as insurgency peaked in Kashmir. Lawlessness, uncertainty, political turmoil along with a few target killings of Pandits led to the migration of almost the entire community from the Valley to other parts of the country"
    • Bhan, Mona; Misri, Deepti; Zia, Ather (2020), "Relating Otherwise: Forging Critical Solidarities Across the Kashmiri Pandit-Muslim Divide.", Biography খণ্ড 43 (2): 285–305, doi:10.1353/bio.2020.0030, "...the everyday modes of relating that existed between Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims in the period leading up to the "Migration," as the Pandit departures have come to be called among Kashmiris, both Pandit and Muslim."
    • Duschinski, Haley (2018), "'Survival Is Now Our Politics': Kashmiri Pandit Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, প্ৰকাশক Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–198, 178–179, ISBN 9781108226127, https://books.google.com/books?id=CPFKDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA178, "The Kashmiri Pandit migration: (p. 178) The onset of the armed phase of the freedom struggle in 1989 was a chaotic and turbulent time in Kashmir (Bose, 2003). Kashmiri Pandits felt an increasing sense of vulnerability"
    • Zutshi 2003, পৃষ্ঠা 318 Quote: "Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950."
  20. ↑
    • Bose, Sumantra (2021), Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict, Yale University Press, pp. 119–120, https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=Gq9FEAAAQBAJ&pg=, "As insurrection gripped the Kashmir Valley in early 1990, the bulk – about 100,000 people – of the Pandit population fled the Valley over a few weeks in February–March 1990 to the southern Indian J&K city of Jammu and further afield to cities such as Delhi. ... The large-scale flight of Kashmiri Pandits during the first months of the insurrection is a controversial episode of the post-1989 Kashmir conflict."
    • Talbot, Ian; Singh, Gurharpal (2009), The Partition of India, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–137, ISBN 9780521672566, "Between 1990 and 1995, 25,000 people were killed in Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed forces. Kashmiris put the figure at 50,000. In addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of Jammu."
    • Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, পৃষ্ঠা 274
  21. ↑
    • Brass, Paul (1994), The Politics of India Since Independence, The New Cambridge History of India (2 সম্পাদনা), প্ৰকাশক Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 222–223, ISBN 978-0-521-45362-2
    • Hussain, Shahla (2018), "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, প্ৰকাশক Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112, 105, ISBN 9781107181977, https://books.google.com/books?id=g09bDwAAQBAJ, "In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community. This event created unbridgeable differences between the majority and the minority; each perceived aazadi in a different light."
    • Snedden, Christopher (2021), Independent Kashmir: An Incomplete Aspiration, প্ৰকাশক Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 126, ISBN 978-1-5261-5614-3, "This is because many Pandits have left Kashmir, or felt compelled by militants’ violence and antipathy against them to leave, since Muslim Kashmiris began their anti-India uprising in 1988"
    • Dabla, Bashir Ahmad (2011), Social Impact of Militancy in Kashmir, প্ৰকাশক New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, p. 98, ISBN 978-81-212-1099-7, "The third migration from rural-urban areas of one place to urban areas of other places involved people who felt compelled to migrate due to political, religious, ethnic, and other such factors. The migration of ... Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir to different parts of JK state and India in 1990–91 fit in this type of migration."
    • Rajput, Sudha G. (4 February 2019), Internal Displacement and Conflict: The Kashmiri Pandits in Comparative Perspective, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 9780429764622, https://books.google.com/books?id=F8yGDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT65, "The grandfather recalled that the state officials, too, had warned the Pandits that 'not every house could be protected from militants.' In the interest of protecting the family from harm and having reached the 'threshold of tolerance and constant mental abuse inflicted by the militants," the grandfather felt compelled to flee the Valley."
    • Hardy, Justine (2009), In the Valley of Mist: Kashmir: One Family in a Changing World, প্ৰকাশক New York and London: The Free Press, p. 63, ISBN 978-1-4391-0289-3, "Children born in Kashmir since 1989 have not heard that song of symbiosis. Just as the young Pandits in the refugee camps have only their parents' memories to portray the homes they felt forced to leave, so, too, do young Kashmir Valley Muslims have only stories and photograph albums as proof of how it used to be before they were born."
    • Sokefeld, Martin (2013), "Jammu and Kashmir: Dispute and diversity", in Berger, Peter; Heidemann, Frank, Anthropology of India: Ethnography, themes, and theory, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, p. 91, ISBN 978-0-415-58723-5, "Since the time of Madan’s fieldwork. the situation of the Kashmiri Pandits has changed dramatically. Instead of 5 per cent, they now make up less than 2 per cent of the Valley’s population. After the beginning of the insurgency, in early 1990, most of the Pandit families left Kashmir for Jammu, Delhi or other places in India. It is still disputed whether the Pandits’ exodus was caused by actual intimidation by the (Muslim) militants or whether they were encouraged to leave by the Indian governor Jagmohan, a ‘hardliner’ who was deputed to Kashmir by the government in Delhi in order to counter the insurgency. Alexander Evans concludes that the Pandits left out of fear, even if not explicitly threatened by the insurgents, and that the administration did nothing to keep them in the Valley (Evans 2002). Since then the ethnography of the Kashmiri Pandits has had to be tuned into the ethnography of exile."
  22. ↑ Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States", Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, Rutgers University Press, p. 132, "Another key point of contention is the community's status as migrants. Kashmiri Hindus are not considered refugees because they have not crossed an international border to seek sanctuary in another country. This means that they are not covered by a well-defined body of international laws and conventions. They would like to be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) because they believe that this designation would give them some leverage to assert their basic rights in their dealings with the Indian state. The government of India refuses to grant them IDP status because it does not want to facilitate international involvement in its internal affairs.<<Footnote 22>> According to this logic, legally classifying the displaced Kashmiri Hindus as IDPs might attract international attention, initiate third-party involvement in the conflict, and prompt international scrutiny of the government's handling of the Kashmir situation. Kashmiri Hindus are thus classified as migrants, meaning that international agencies such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) do not play a role in their situation. Kashmiri Hindus vehemently dispute their classification as migrants because they believe that it carries the connotation that they have left their homeland of their own will, and are able to return freely, without threat of harm."
  23. ↑ Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States", Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, Rutgers University Press, p. 141, "–<<Footnote 22>>: In 1995, the Kashmiri Samiti Delhi issued a petition to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) demanding that authorities extend to the Kashmiri Pandit community facilities and rights—such as nonrefoulement, humanitarian assistance, and the right to seek asylum—on the basis of their internal displacement. The petition also demanded that the government implement the recommendations of the representative of the UN secretary-general on IDPs and invited the NHRC to meet representatives of the displaced community. The NHRC issued a notice to the state government to respond to the petition. The government, in its response to the NHRC, argued that the Kashmiri Pandits are appropriately described as "migrants" since the word favors the community's return when the situation becomes more conducive. After reviewing the petition and the government's response to it. the NHRC indicated that the Kashmiri Pandits did not meet the typical definition of IDPs in light of the government's benevolent attitude toward them."
  24. ↑
    • Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha (2001), Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, p. 226, ISBN 0-415-16951-8, "In 1989 and the early 1990s a popularly backed armed insurgency was orchestrated by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which called for a secular and sovereign Kashmir. Kashmiri cultural and linguistic identity appeared to be more potent than Islamic aspirations or pro-Pakistan sentiment in the Vale of Kashmir. In time, however, the balance of firepower among the rebels shifted to the Hizbul Mujahideen, which received more support from Pakistan. The Indian state deployed more than 550,000 armed personnel in the early 1990s to severely repress the Kashmir movement."
    • Staniland, Paul (2014), Networks of Rebellion: Explaing Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, প্ৰকাশক Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 73–76, ISBN 978-0-8014-5266-6, "The early years of JKLF activity, especially in 1988, involved coordinated, publicly symbolic strikes carried out by a relatively small number of fighters. Central control processes at this point were handled by the four original organizers. Crackdowns by the Indian government spurred mobilization, and “within two years, the previously marginal JKLF emerged as the vanguard and spearhead of a popular uprising in the Kashmir Valley against Indian rule. It dominated the first three years of the insurgency (1990–92).”! Even to the present day, “most commentators agree that among Muslims in the Valley, the JKLF enjoys considerable popular support.” This was especially the case in the early 1990s, when contemporary observers argued that “the predominant battle cry in Kashmir is azadi (freedom) and not a merger with Pakistan’”and that “the JKLF, a secular militant group, is by far the most popular. The support for the JKLF was clearly substantial and greater than that of its militant contemporaries. ... In the early years of the war in Kashmir, the JKLF was the center of insurgency, but I will show later in this chapter how the social-institutional weakness of the organization made it vulnerable to targeting by the Indian leadership and dissention from local units. The Hizbul Mujahideen became the most robus organization in the fight in Kashmir. While its rise to dominance occurred after 1990, its mobilization during 1989–1991 through networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami laid the basis for an integrated organization that persisted until it shifted to a vanguard structure in the early to mid-2000s."
    • D'Mello, Bernard (2018), India After Naxalbari: Unfinished History, প্ৰকাশক New York: Monthly Review Press, ISBN 978-158367-707-0, https://books.google.com/books?id=8K07DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT243, "The Kashmir question, centered on the right to national self-determination, cannot be dealt with here, but to cut a long story short, the last nail that the Indian political establishment hammered into the coffin of liberal-political democracy in Kashmir was the rigging of the 1987 state assembly elections there. The Muslim United Front would have electorally defeated the Congress Party-National Conferencecombine if the election had not been rigged. Many of the victims of this political fraud became the leaders of the Kashmir liberation (azaadi) movement. In the initial years, 1988–1992, the movement, led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular organization, seemed to have unequivocally taken a stand for the independence of J&K from the occupation of India and Pakistan. But for this stand of the JKLF, it had to bear a heavy cost in terms of human lives and sustenance"
    • Kumar, Radha; Puri, Ellora (2009), "Jammu and Kashmir: Frameworks for a Settlement", in Kumar, Radha, Negotiation Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: A Set of Simulations, প্ৰকাশক New Delhi, Los Angeles and London: SAGE Publications, p. 292, ISBN 978-81-7829-882-5, "1990–2001: An officially estimated 10,000 Kashmiri youth crossover to Pakistan for training and procurement of arms. The Hizb-ul Mujahedeen (Hizb), which is backed by Pakistan, increases its strength dramatically. ISI favours the Hizb over the secular JKLF and cuts off financing to the JKLF and in some instances, provides intelligence to India against the JKLF. In April 1991, Kashmiris hold anti-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar following killing of a JKLF area commander by the Hizb. In 1992, Pakistani forces arrest 500 JKLF marchers led by Amanullah Khan in Pakistan held Kashmir (PoK) to prevent a bid to cross the border. India also uses intelligence from captured militants. JKLF militancy declines."
    • Phillips, David L. (8 September 2017), From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 9781351518857, https://books.google.com/books?id=pq00DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT13, "Consistent with the concept of Kashmiriyat, the JKLF was essentially a secular organization that aspired to the establishment of an independent Kashmir where both Muslims and Hindus would be welcome. This ideal is anathema to Pakistan-based fundamentalists as well as to Afghan and Arab fighters who care far less about Kashmiri self-determination than they do about establishing Pakistani rule and creating an Islamic caliphate in Srinagar."
    • Morton, Stephen (2008), Salman Rushdie: Fictions of Postcolonial Modernity, New British Fiction, প্ৰকাশক Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 143–144, ISBN 978-1-4039-9700-5, "Yet if General Kachhwaha’s military campaign of terror against Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley of Kashmir gives the lie to Nehru’s legacy of secularism and tolerance by exposing the hegemonic and military power of India’s Hindu majority, Rushdie’s account of the secular nationalism of the Jammu Kashmir liberation front in Shalimar the Clown seems to embody what the postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha calls subaltern secularism (Bhabha 1996). For the secular nationalism of the Jammu and Kashmir liberation front (JKLF) is precisely subaltern in the sense that it reflects the view of the Kashmiri people rather than the elite, a people ‘of no more than five million souls, landlocked, preindustrial, resource rich but cash poor, perched thousands of feet up in the mountains’"
    • Tompkins, Paul J. Jr. (2012), Crossett, Chuck, ed., Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II, 1962–2009, প্ৰকাশক Fort Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command and The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory, pp. 455–456, OCLC 899141935, "More than the relatively simple denial of civil and political rights that characterized the Kashmiri government for more than four decades, the events of 1990, when Governor Jagmohan and the Indian government stepped up their counterinsurgency efforts, developed into a pronounced human rights crisis"—there were rampant abuses such as unarmed protestors shot indiscriminately, arrests without trial, and the rape and torture of prisoners. Jagmohan whitewashed the security forces’ role in human rights violations, laying the blame for atrocities at the feet of “terrorist forces. In February, he also dissolved the Assembly. Combined with the severe, indiscriminate harassment of the population, whereby all citizens were treated as potential suspects, the January massacre, and Jagmohan’s draconian policies, support for the JKLF skyrocketed!"... However, it was JKLF, an ostensible secular, pro-independence movement, that dominated the field at the onse of the insurgency."
  25. ↑
    • Lapidus, Ira A. (2014), A History of Islamic Societies (3 সম্পাদনা), প্ৰকাশক Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 720, ISBN 978-0-521-51430-9, "By the mid-1980s, however, trust between Delhi and local leaders had again broken down, and Kashmiris began a fully fledged armed insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front calling for an independent and secular Kashmir. As the military struggle went on, Muslim—Hindu antagonism rose; Kashmiris began to define themselves in Muslim terms. Pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan sentiment became more important than secularism, and the leadership of the insurgency shifted to the Harakat and the Hizb ul-Mujahidin. To achieve its strategic objectives the Pakistani military and its intelligence services supported militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who attacked Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and more recently attacked civilians in India. Saudi influences, more militant forms of Islam, and the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services gave the struggle in Kashmir the aura of a jihad. The fighting escalated with the deployment of more than 500,000 Indian soldiers to suppress the resistance."
    • Metcalf, Barbara D.; Metcalf, Thomas R. (2012), A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge Concise Histories (3 সম্পাদনা), প্ৰকাশক Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 308–309, ISBN 978-1-107-02649-0, "The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. ...As the government sought to locate ‘suspects’ and weed out Pakistani ‘infiltrators’, the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict."
    • Varma, Saiba (2020), The Occupied Clinic: Militarism and Care in Kashmir, প্ৰকাশক Durham and London: Duke University Press, p. 27, ISBN 9781478009924, "In 1988, the JKLF, an organization with secular, leftist roots, waged a guerrilla war against Indian armed forces with the slogan Kashmir banega khudmukhtar (Kashmir will be independent). Other organizations, such as the Jama’at Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), supported merging with Pakistan. In 1988, Kashmiris began an armed struggle to overthrow Indian rule. Because some armed groups received assistance from Pakistan, the Indian state glossed the movement as Pakistani-sponsored “cross-border terrorism,” while erasing its own extralegal actions in the region. Part of India’s claim over Kashmir rests on its self-image as a pluralistic, democratic, and secular country. However, many Kashmiris feel they have never enjoyed the fruits of Indian democracy, as draconian laws have been in place for decades. Further, many see Indian rule as the latest in a long line of foreign colonial occupations."
    • Sirrs, Owen L. (2017), Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert action and internal operations, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, p. 157, ISBN 978-1-138-67716-6, "Fortunately for ISI, another option emerged from quite unexpected direction: the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Frong (JKLF). A creature of its times, the JKLF was guided by a secular, nationalistic ideology, which emphasized the independenc of Kashmir above union with Pakistan or India. This fact alone meant that JKLF was not going to be a good match for ISI's long-term goal of a united Kashmir under the Pakistan banner. Still, in lieu of any viable alternative, the JKLF was the best short-term expedient for ISI plans."
    • Webb, Matthew J. (2012), Kashmir's Right to Secede: A Critical Examination of Contemporary Theories of Secession, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, p. 44, ISBN 978-0-415-66543-8, "The first wave of militancy from 1988 through to 1991 was very much an urban, middle-class affair dominated by the secular, pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)."
    • Thomas, Raju G. C, ed. (4 June 2019), Perspectives On Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 978-0-367-28273-8, "The exception in this case, which is also the largest group among the nationalists, is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF claims to adhere to the vision of a secular independent Kashmir. ... The JKLF committed to an independent but secular Kashmir, is willing to take the Hindus back."
    • Chandrani, Yogesh; Kumar, Radha (2003), "South Asia: Introduction", The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad, প্ৰকাশক New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press, p. 396, ISBN 0-231-12711-1, "Decades of misrule and repression in Indian-held Kashmir had led to a popular and armed uprising in 1989. In its initial stages, the uprising was dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular movement that demanded Kashmir's independence from Indian rule. The Indian government deployed the army and brutally suppressed the uprising. The Pakistani security establishment at first supported the JKLF and then began to seek more pliable allies."
    • Sokefeld, Martin (2012), "Secularism and the Kashmir dispute", in Bubandt, Nils; van Beek, Martijn, Varieties of Secularism in Asia: Anthropological Explorations of Religion, Politics, and the Spiritual, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, pp. 101–120, 109, 114, ISBN 978-0-415-61672-0, "(p. 109) Like the Plebiscite Front, the JKLF portrayed the Kashmir issue as a national issue and Kashmir as a multi-religious nation to which Muslims, Hindus and members of other religions belonged. While Pakistan was considered as a ‘friend’ of the Kashmiri nation, the purpose of the JKLF was not accession with the state but the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. In the mid-1980s, the JKLF became a significant force among (Azad) Kashmiris in Britain. Towards the end of the decade, with the support of Pakistani intelligence agencies, the JKLF extended into Indian administered Kashmir and initiated the uprising there. (p. 114) In writings about the Kashmir dispute, secular political mobilisation of Muslim Kashmiris is frequently disregarded. Even when it is mentioned it is often not taken seriously. ... The Kashmir issue is much more complex than the orthodox view on the problem concedes. It is neither simply a conflict between India and Pakistan nor an issue between religion/Islam on the one hand and secularism on the other. ... In the 1980s and early 1990s Kashmiri nationalists, especially those of the JKLF, considered Pakistan a kind of natural ally for their purposes. But when Pakistani agencies shifted their support to Islamist militants ('jihadis') in Kashmir, most nationalists were alienated from Pakistan."
    • Sharma, Deepti (2015), "The Kashmir insurgency: multiple actors, divergent interests, institutionalized conflict", in Chima, Jugdeep S., Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identities, interests and challenges to state authority, প্ৰকাশক London and New York: Routledge, pp. 17–40, 27–28, ISBN 978-1-138-83992-2, "The JKLF, with its indigenous roots, had insider credentials and its secular ideology appealed to a population that had learned to equate ethnic nationalism with Sheikh Abdullah’s version of Kashmiriyat. After the insurgency was in full swing, the Islamist groups made progress with their superior experience in militancy and greater resources. At this point, the JKLF’s secular ideology and its popularity became an obstacle in their path to complete control of the insurgency. In 1992, Pakistan arrested more than 500 JKLF members, including Amanullah Khan, a JKLF leader in PoK. It is alleged that Pakistan also provided intelligence on JKLF members to the Indian military, which led to the JKLF members being either arrested or killed."
  26. ↑
  27. ↑ Hussain, Shahla (2021), Kashmir in the Aftermath of the Partition, Cambridge University Press, pp. 320, 321, ISBN 9781108901130, https://books.google.com/books?id=_URFEAAAQBAJ, "The Counter-narrative of Aazadi: Kashmiri Hindus and Displacement of the Homeland (p. 320) The minority Hindu community of the Valley, which had always presented itself as a group of true Indian patriots wedded to their Indian identity, now found itself in an extreme dilemma as the tehreek-i-aazadi threatened their security. The community felt safer as a part of Hindu-majority India, as it feared political domination in Muslim-majority Kashmir. It had thus often opposed Kashmiri Muslim calls for self-determination, equating this with anti-nationalism."
  28. ↑ Rai, Mridu (2021), "Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past", in Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha, Kashmir and the Future of South Asia, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, ISBN 9781000318845, https://books.google.com/books?id=K20LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA106, "An important element in the recollections of many Pandits is the effect the killing in the early 1990s of a number of Pandit officials had in shaking their sense of security. Various groups of militants claim that their targets were Indian government 'agents' and so, in eliminating them, they were essentially waging war against the state. Contrariwise, Pandits insist that the targets being exclusively Hindu indicated a 'communal' threat. It is only common sense that not every Pandit could have been an informer or a spy. But what is perplexing is that while the connection of numerous Pandits with the state's intelligence apparatus is denied in discussions relating to their roles in Kashmir, it is well advertised when making demands upon the state's resources in Indian law courts. The latter became an important arena for shaping Pandit narratives. ... At any rate, these testimonies freely given in Indian courts corroborate the claim of militants that at least some Pandits did act as agents of the state in Kashmir; of course, this does not offer justification for killing them."
  29. ↑ Bose, Sumantra (2021), Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict, Yale University Press, pp. 119–120, https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=Gq9FEAAAQBAJ&pg=, "JKLF's series of targeted assassinations that began in August 1989 (see Chapter 1) included a number of prominent Pandits. Tika Lal Taploo, the president of the Hindu nationalist BJP's Kashmir Valley unit, was killed in September 1989, followed in November by Neelkanth Ganjoo, the judge who had sentenced the JKLF pioneer Maqbool Butt to death in 1968 (the execution was carried out in 1984). As the Valley descended into mayhem in early 1990, Lassa Koul, the Pandit director of the Srinagar station of India's state-run television, was killed on 13 February 1990 by JKLF gunmen. The murders of such high-profile members of the community may have spread a wave of fear among Pandits at large."
  30. ↑ Snedden, Christopher (2021), Independent Kashmir: An Incomplete Aspiration, Manchester University Press, p. 132, ISBN 9781526156150, https://books.google.com/books?id=ZfEuEAAAQBAJ, "Some other slogans were clearly directed against pro-India Kashmiri Pandits. ... by the end of January 1990, loudspeakers in Srinagar mosques were broadcasting slogans like 'Kafiron Kashmir chhod do [Infidels, leave our Kashmir]"
  31. ↑ Zutshi, Chitralekha (8 November 2017). Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation. Cambridge University Press. পৃষ্ঠা. 230. ISBN 978-1-108-40210-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=EaHRtAEACAAJ. "Anti-Hindu announcements in neighbourhood mosques, such as, ‘Kashmir kiske liye? Mussalman ke liye’ (Kashmir is for whom? For the Muslim), resulted in a large, almost total exodus of most of the Valley’s Hindu (Pandit) population."
  32. ↑ Hussain, Shahla (2021), Kashmir in the Aftermath of the Partition, Cambridge University Press, pp. 320, 321, ISBN 9781108901130, https://books.google.com/books?id=_URFEAAAQBAJ, "The polarized political positions that the two communities had adopted since 1947 reached a breaking point in the new political climate of the 1990s, when Kashmiri Muslims openly invoked anti-India slogans and demanded aazadi. As the new valorization of armed resistance gripped the region, targeted killings of prominent members of the Kashmiri Hindu community whom the JKLF insurgents believed to be Indian intelligence agents sent shivers down the spine of the minority community. Stories of Kashmiri Pandits, branded as "informers," and killed in their own homes or in their alleys, and survived by grieving wives and children, had a tremendous impact on the psyche of the minority community. Their fears were heightened as religious slogans merged with the cry for independence emerging from the mosques of Kashmir. Certain militant groups even wrote threatening letters to the Kashmiri Hindu community, asking them to leave the Valley."
  33. ↑ Evans 2002, p.23: "P. S. Verma echoes this; his interviews with migrant Pandits found few who had actually been personally harmed or threatened to leave the Valley (and many who had been begged to stay by their Muslim neighbours). A research study conducted by postgraduate politics students at the University of Jammu in 2001 found that 2% of KPs surveyed had received threatening letters; however, over 80% had not received any form of direct threat. Nevertheless, as Verma states, most of these migrants 'felt very much threatened in an atmosphere of unabated violence, particularly during January–February 1990 when the major exodus took place'. My own interviews with a number of KPs in Jammu, many of whom hold Pakistan responsible, suggest suspicions of ethnic cleansing or even genocide are wide of the mark."
  34. ↑ Datta 2017, p. 61–63: "While most accounts of events in Kashmir featured militancy and demonstrations against the Indian state, few references are made to the Pandits. The slogans the Pandits refer to have never been reported or recorded officially at the time and suggest a gap between what was recorded and what the Pandits describe.... Yet conversations [with Kashmiri Muslims] regarding the Pandit exodus were complicated by their insistence that the Pandits were not targeted by the Muslims. They denied hearing (p.63) the slogans, even those threatening women, from the demonstrations which the Pandits draw attention to."
  35. ↑ Evans 2002, p. 20: "Most KPs believe that they were forced out of the Kashmir Valley; whether by Pakistan and the militant groups it backed, or by Kashmiri Muslims as a community. Representing the latter variant, Pyarelal Kaul contends that the Pandit departure was a clear case of communal intimidation by Muslims, designed to expel Hindus from the Valley. Mosques 'were used as warning centres. Threatening the Hindus and conveying to them what terrorists and many Muslims of Kashmir wanted to achieve.'"
  36. ↑ Bhan, Mona; Duschinski, Haley; Zia, Ather (20 April 2018), "Introduction. 'Rebels of the Streets': Violence, Protest, and Freedom in Kashmir", in Duschinski, Haley; Bhan, Mona; Zia, Ather et al., Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 25–27, ISBN 9780812249781, https://books.google.com/books?id=ZwVODwAAQBAJ&pg=PA26, ". Their stories of departure are deeply contested; while many in Kashmir view their departure from Kashmir as Governor Jagmohan Malhotra' grand design to exterminate Muslims once Kashmir's Hindu minority had fled the valley, many Kashmiri Pandits track the onset of Kashmir's armed rebellion in 1989 to a new brand of Islamic extremism, which in their view posed a grave threat to Kashmir's Hindu minority (Duschinski 2008)."
  37. ↑ Hussain, Shahla (2021), Kashmir in the Aftermath of the Partition, Cambridge University Press, pp. 320, 321, ISBN 9781108901130, https://books.google.com/books?id=_URFEAAAQBAJ, "In this violent and unstable atmosphere, rumors spread that the exodus of Kashmiri Hindus was the machinations of the state governor who planned to use unrestrained force to suppress Kashmiri Muslim resistance and thus viewed the presence of the Kashmiri Hindus in the neighborhoods as a hindrance to the army in quickly and efficiently carrying out its plan.'!" Many Kashmiri Muslims claimed to have "witnessed departing Pandits boarding vehicles organized by the state," and felt fearful about their own security. A senior Indian administrator, Wajahat Habibullah, posted in Kashmir at this critical juncture, denied the involvement of the government in a coordinated plan for Kashmiri Hindu departure. However, he emphasized that the state governor did little to stop the Pandits from leaving the Valley. Jagmohan remained adamant that he would not be able to offer protection to the Valley's widely dispersed Hindu community, and rejected Habibullah's suggestion to televise "the request of hundreds of Muslims to their Pandit compatriots not to leave the valley." Instead, the government reassured Pandits of their support in settling them in refugee camps in Jammu and paying the civil servants their salaries, if the community decided to leave"
  1. ↑ Still another estimates it to be 190,000 of a total population of 200,000.[10] The CIA Factbook estimated the number to be 300,000.[11]
  2. ↑ Oxford English Dictionary Online defines exodus as – "The departure or going out, usually of a body of persons from a country for the purpose of settling elsewhere. Cf. 'emigration n. 2': The departure of persons from one country, usually their native land, to settle permanently in another.[18]
  3. ↑ Kashmiri Pandits are not considered "refugees" as they have not crossed an international border. Many Pandits would like to be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), but the Indian government has denied them that status, fearing international involvement in Kashmir, which it considers to be its internal affair. The Indian government considers Kashmiri Pandits to be 'migrants.'[22][23]
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